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Abstract
In peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, soft information,
such as borrowers’ facial features, textual
descriptions of loan applications and so on, are
regarded as potential signals to screen borrowers. In
this study, we examine the signaling effect of a new
category of soft information- social media information.
Leveraging a unique dataset that combines loan data
from a large P2P lending company with social media
presence data from a popular social media site, and
two natural experiments, we find two forms of social
media information that act as signals of borrowers’
creditworthiness. First, borrowers’ choice to
self-disclose their social media account is a predictor
of their default probability. Second, borrowers’ social
media presence, such as their social network and
social media engagement, are also predictors of
default probability. This study proffers new insights
for the screening process in P2P lending and novel
usage of social media information.

1. Introduction
Peer-to-peer lending, also known as P2P lending,
is the practice of lenders lending money to unrelated
individuals
without
going
through
a
traditional financial
intermediary.
Instead,
the
transactions are intermediated by P2P lending
platforms, which provide online venues for lenders
and borrowers to communicate and transact. The first
P2P lending company, Zopa, was founded in UK in
February 2005. Afterwards, dozens of imitators
emerge across the world. By the year of 2015, there
are thousands of P2P lending companies worldwide,
and the loans funded on the biggest P2P lending
platform, LendingClub, have reached $7 billion.
Peer-to-peer loans are unsecured personal loans.
Lacking effective screening methods on small
borrowers’ creditworthiness, traditional financial
institutions tend to do very little screening for small
borrowers and rely excessively on collaterals [1-4].
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However, in P2P lending markets, borrowers do not
provide collateral as a protection to lenders
against default. This practice, on the one hand, makes
P2P lending particularly attractive for small borrowers
who might otherwise turn to pay day lenders or credit
card debt [5], and on the other hand, makes it very
challenging for non-expert lenders who have to
identify credible borrowers and assess default risk by
themselves.
Essentially, the financial risk in loan markets is
caused by information asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers. In order to alleviate information
asymmetry, P2P lending platforms encourage
borrowers to submit as much relevant information as
possible. The borrower information can be divided
into two categories: standard ―hard‖ information,
which directly reflects borrowers’ financial status or
creditworthiness, such as credit score, debt-to-income
ratio and annual income; and non-standard ―soft‖
information, which has no direct relationship with
borrowers’ financial status or creditworthiness and
usually posted by borrowers voluntarily, such as a
borrower’s picture or a textual description of his future
plan [6].
It is found that lenders make use of both
information
categories
to
infer
borrowers’
creditworthiness. Soft information is a useful
supplement to hard information in the loan
underwriting process, especially for borrowers with
poor credit, whose hard information is usually
unattractive [7]. Prior studies has examined the
signaling effect of a variety of soft information, such
as borrowers’ pictures, textual descriptions of the
usage of loans, etc.[7], facial features [8-10] and social
network characteristics on P2P platforms [11, 12].
Different from all these studies, we focus on a new
and promising category of soft information borrowers’ self-disclosed social media information.
As one of the most transformative IT applications,
social media changes people’s life almost in every
aspect. A recent report from Pew Research Center
published in 2013 finds that 73% of online adults use a
social media site of some kind (e.g., Facebook, Twitter,
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LinkedIn), and 42% of them use two or more social
media platforms. People use social media to
communicate, collaborate, consume and even create,
making social media a valuable information source
about individuals. In P2P lending platforms, some
borrowers voluntarily disclose their social media
account, which makes their social media information
accessible to lenders or P2P lending platforms. Are
borrowers who choose to disclose their social media
account more creditworthy than non-disclosing
borrowers? Is the social media information they
choose to disclose useful in assessing their default
propensity? To our knowledge, no answers have been
given for these questions yet.
Our study intends to answer the above questions
by examining a combined data set obtained from both
a P2P lending platform and a social media site. We
first collected loan listing and borrower information
from a P2P lending platform and marked the
borrowers who disclosed their account with a certain
social media site. Then, we collected these borrowers’
social media information from the site. With these
collected data, we model borrowers’ default
probability as a function of borrowers’ choice to
disclose their social media account or not, controlling
for relevant factors such as borrowers’ demographic
characteristics and identity verifications. The result
shows that borrowers who disclosed their social media
information have a significant lower default
probability compared to those who did not. In order to
rule out the effect of self-selection, we leverage a
natural experiment introduced by the P2P lending site
that enabled borrowers to link to their social media
sites. We further employ propensity score matching
(PSM) technique to assess the relationship and the
results are consistent. Furthermore we examine the
relationship between borrowers’ social media
engagement and their default probability. We find
social media engagement, such as the scope of the
social network a borrower builds up and his activity
level in a social media site, act as predictors of
borrowers’ default probability.
Our study makes three contributions to the P2P
lending literature. First, we discover a predictive
relationship between borrowers’ choice to disclose
their social media information and their default
probability. Second, we found borrowers’ social media
engagement also predicts their default probability.
These findings identify a new category of soft
information that is useful for screening borrowers on
P2P lending platforms. Finally, by examining a unique
data set combining data from both a P2P lending site
and a social media site, we have integrated borrowers’
financial behavior with their social media
characteristics for the first time in the literature.

2.

Theoretical Background and
Hypotheses

There is a stream of literature that focus on the
information asymmetry in P2P lending markets. Since
P2P lenders have less access to ―hard‖ information
such as borrower credit history, income, or
employment status, they experience a higher degree of
information asymmetry as compared to traditional
lenders. To cope with the shortage of ―hard‖
information, P2P lenders tend to make more use of
―soft‖ information, such as borrowers’ picture or a
textual description of the purpose of a loan [8-10].
Moreover, friendship of borrowers exhibited on a P2P
lending platform is examined, and certain types of
friendships show signaling effects on default rate and
others do not [11, 12].
Our study complements the recent literature by
specifically examining a new type of soft information social media information. Although it is related to
social network, this category of information is
different from the ―friendship‖ studied by [11, 12] in
two aspects. First, the ―friendship‖ referred to in our
studies is not located in a P2P lending platform, but
located in a social media site instead. Second, social
media information we examine here includes not only
borrowers’ friendship information but also borrowers’
decision on disclosing their social media accounts, and
borrowers’ engagement in social media.
2.1 Disclosing Social Media Account as a Predictor
of Default Probability
In our study, a borrower disclosing his social media
account on a P2P lending platform means disclosing
more information about himself, including the social
network that he builds up in the social media site,
which raises the possibility that his default behavior
being known to his friends. Literature on social
psychology shows that being honest, trustworthy and
fair is important for a moral social image in the eyes of
others [13, 14]. A moral failure damages one’s social
image, and consequently damages social bond to others
[13-15] and lead to social punishment of being
marginalized, ostracized, or excluded [14, 16]. Default
on a loan is very likely to damage someone’s social
image and causes social punishment. Moreover,
literature on social capital finds that social capital is a
valuable resource [17, 18]. The sources of social capital
lie not only in the structure and content of our social
relations but also in trust [19-21]. Anything that makes
someone less trustworthy, such as default on a loan,
weakens his social capital. Finally, economic theories
of social stigma points out that a default imposes a
social stigma cost on a borrower if his friends know
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about the default [22-24]. Therefore, borrowers who
are at the risk of default are less inclined to share their
social media accounts, in order to prevent their friends
in the social media site from knowing their default in
case it happens. We therefore propose:
HYPOTHESIS 1. Borrowers who voluntarily
disclose their social media accounts on a P2P lending
platform are less likely to default
2.2 Self-Disclosed Social Media Information as
Predictors of Default Probability
For those borrowers who have disclosed their
social media accounts, their social media information
can be collected and used to predict their default
probability. In this study, we focus on two social
media metrics: the scope of borrowers’ social network,
and borrowers’ engagement in the social media.
The scope of borrowers’ social network refers to
how many friends or acquaintances a borrower has in
his social network. It has an effect on how much
damage a default could cause to a borrower’s social
image and social capital, or how much stigma costs a
default brings about. Specifically, the larger the social
network, the more damage or costs a default can cause.
Therefore, a borrower who has a larger social network
should be more motivated to avoid a default.
Accordingly, we propose Hypothesis 2a.
HYPOTHESIS 2a. Borrowers who have a larger
social network in the social media site are less likely
to default on the P2P lending platform.
Borrowers’ engagement refers to how much a
borrower is involved in the social media site, such as
how many posts a borrower submit or how many
dialogues a borrower hosts or joins. It is closely
related to the time and efforts a borrower invests in the
social media site. As these inputs are aimed to
establish a good social image or good relationships
with others, if a default behavior destroys the
established social image and relationships, the loss to a
borrower who has engaged substantially is more than
that to a borrower who has engaged little. From
another point of view, the more a borrower engages in
building up his social image and relationships, the
more he values the image and relationships. He should
be more reluctant to default. Thus, we have
HYPOTHESIS 2b. Borrowers who have more
engagement in the social media site are less likely to
default on the P2P lending platform.

3. Data Collection
A key and notable contribution of our study is that
we combine data related to borrowers’ financial
behavior in a P2P lending platform with their

information in a social media site. In other words, our
data consists of two parts: P2P lending data and social
media data.
3.1 P2P lending data
The P2P lending data come from one of the largest
online P2P lending platform in China. It was launched
in June 2007. By the end of 2013, it has had over
600,000 members and nearly $173 million in funded
loans. The company, as a platform providing matching
between borrowers and lenders, requires borrowers to
provide both loan and personal information for initial
screening. Loan information includes loan amount,
duration, and objectives of the loan. Personal
information includes demographic information,
education background, income status and any other
information that the borrower is willing to provide.
For a loan that passes initial screening, the company
posts the relevant information on the website. Lenders
examine such information and decide whether to
invest, and if yes, how much to invest. The company
does not provide any guarantee of loan payment. All
the risks are borne by the lenders.
Our data sample covers all peer-to-peer lending
listings on this company between January 2011 and
August 2013. It consists of 35,457 loan records and
11,047 borrower records in total. Variables related to
listed loans include loan amount, interest rate, opening
and closing dates, credit grade from A (high quality) to
HR (low quality) and the outcome of loan repayment.
Variables related to borrowers contain borrower’s
demographic characteristics, including age, gender,
education level and marital status, and verification
items, including identity card verification, education
certificate verification, phone number verification and
image verification.
3.2 Social media data
Over 40% borrowers in the company have
disclosed their Sina microblog account to the platform.
Sina microblog is the biggest microblog site in China,
which opened in September 2009 and has had nearly
300 million users by the end of 2013. The dataset
obtained includes a variable which marks whether a
borrower disclosed his/her Sina microblog account. For
those borrowers who have disclosed their Sina account
(5239 borrowers in total), we accessed their microblog
page and collected relevant data. The data we obtained
from their microblog pages include social network
scope metric, and engagement metric.

4. Variable Definitions
4.1 Dependent variable
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Default. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable. The value is 1 if the borrower defaulted on a
loan and 0 if the borrower never defaulted on any
loans. A borrower may default on more than one loan,
but the value of the variable is still 1 in these cases.
Actually, very few borrowers defaulted on two or
more loans, since borrowers in default are not allowed
to make a new loan request.
4.2 Independent variables
Microblog_Disclosed. It is a dummy variable,
which is 1 if the borrower disclosed his Sina
microblog account on the ppdai.com platform,
otherwise is 0. As long as the borrower discloses his
account, staff on the platform can obtain a verified
hyperlink to access the borrower’s microblog
homepage. Through the homepage, the staff can obtain
more information about the borrower and potentially
contact his followers listed on his profile page.
#Followers. For a borrower who has a Sina
microblog account, followers are the ones who
subscribe to the borrower’s microblog and follow all
the updates of the borrower. The number of followers
can be regarded as a proxy for the scope of borrowers’
social network in the Sina microblog site. Moreover,
followers can be differentiated by whether they are
followed by the borrower. If two persons follow each
other’s microblog, they are probably friends and know
each other in real life, or they are interested in each
other and want to be friends. If the follower is not
followed by the borrower, he/she is probably a fan
rather than a friend of the borrower. Therefore, we
have two sub-level proxies for the scope of borrowers’
social network, that is, #Friends and #Fans.
#Microblogs. We use the number of microblogs
that the borrower has posted on his microblog page as
a measurement of his engagement in the social media
site, since posting microblogs is the major way for a
borrower to express himself and to attract followers’
attention in the microblog site. Posting more
microblogs costs the borrower more time and efforts.
4.3 Control Variables
Borrower’s demographic characteristics. This set
of control variables includes borrowers’ age, gender,
marital status and education. If a borrower is a male,
his value of gender is 0; otherwise, the value is 1. If a
borrower is single, his value of marital status is 0;
otherwise, the value is 1. The value of education
corresponds to the highest degree a borrower has

obtained, which ranges from 1 to 6. The value 1 stands
for a middle school degree or lower; the value 6 stands
for a postgraduate degree; and the rest values stand for
degrees between them.
Borrower’s pre-verification. It is a set of dummy
variables. PPdai.com recommends borrowers go
through a variety of verification processes before
making a loan request. The processes include
verification of borrowers’ identity card, education
certificate, phone number and image (i.e. online visual
verification). Therefore, we use a set of dummy
variables to correspond to the processes respectively.
The value of a dummy variable is 1, if the borrower
has gone through a specific verification process,
otherwise the value is 0.

5. Empirical Modeling and Results
We begin by analyzing the relationship between
the default outcome and borrowers’ choice to disclose
their microblog account. We use a logit regression
model first, and then we utilize the propensity score
matching (PSM) technique and instrument variable
regressions to address the endogeneity concerns.
Afterwards, based on the combined data collected
from the P2P lending platform and the social media
site, we analyze the effects of social media metrics
with a logit regression model. The test examines if the
scope of borrowers’ social network and borrowers’
engagement in the social media site have effects on
default probability.
5.1 The Effect of Microblog Disclosure on Default
Probability
In this part of analysis, the sample data is obtained
from ppdai.com. There are 11047 borrower listings in
our sample, and 48% borrowers disclose their Sina
microblog accounts. We model a default as occurring if
a payment is late by 120 days, which is suggested by
ppdai.com.
5.1.1 Logistic Regression Model. Table 1 reports
estimate of a logit model for the probability that a
borrower defaults on a loan. With a set of control
variables, we estimate

The results in Table 1 show that microblog disclosure
is positively related to the default probability and is
significant at 0.01 level. Hypothesis 1 is supported.

Table 1. Logit regression model of borrower default
Variable

Parameter

Std. error
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Microblog_disclosed
Education
Marital status
Gender
Age
Image verified
Education verified
Phone# verified
IDCertification verified
Constant
N
Log likelihood
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01

-0.748***
-0.150***
-0.158***
-0.593***
-0.012**
0.090
-0.614***
-0.069
-0.159***
0.134

0.055
0.024
0.059
0.086
0.005
0.056
0.073
0.063
0.061
0.167
11047
-5027.467

However, we find that for each covariate, the
difference in averages by microblog disclosure status
is significant (see Table 2), which means the data are
unbalanced in covariates between the group who
discloses microblog and who does not. The unbalance

of the data weakens the reliability of the results of the
regression model [25]. Therefore, we utilize
Propensity Score Matching to adjust for the
differences in covariates in the next section.

Table 2. The difference in averages of covariate by microblog disclosure status
Variable
Education
Marital status
Gender
Age
Image verified
Education verified
Phone# verified
IDCertification verified

Mean
Mblog
Disclosed=1
3.6288
1.4614
1.1262
29.362
.68253
.28742
.86058
.84845

Mblog
Disclosed=0
3.6507
1.5642
1.1422
30.993
.46551
.26295
.72898
.65350

5.1.2 PSM. The objective of PSM is to select
treatment and control borrowers who resemble each
other in all relevant characteristics except for
microblog disclosure (the treatment), thereby creating
a statistical equivalence between the two groups by
balancing them on observed covariates.
The first step to perform propensity score
matching analysis is to estimate the propensity scores
(PS). A logit model was estimated to derive the
propensity scores where the outcome variable is
microblog disclosure. The model is not a behavioral

t-test
t

p

-0.99
-10.86
-2.47
-15.01
23.61
2.88
17.29
24.21

0.323
0.000
0.014
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000

one, but simply a statistical device that enables us to
weight differences in observable variables between
borrowers who disclose their microblog and those who
do not. From the weights—the coefficients in the logit
model—we can construct a propensity score for each
treated and control case. The PS values summarize
several characteristics of each subject into a
single-index, which makes matching subjects on an
n-dimensional vector of characteristics feasible. These
results of the logit model along with the fit statistics
are reported in Table 3.

Table 3. Logit regression model of microblog disclosure
Variable
Education
Marital status
Gender
Age
Image verified
Education verified
Phone# verified
IDCertification verified
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01

Parameter
0.037*
-0.235***
-0.037
-0.046***
0.595***
-0.170***
-0.563***
-0.851***

We then perform the process of matching the

Std. error
0.020
0.047
0.059
0.004
0.043
0.052
0.053
0.052

treatment and control borrowers using the estimated
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propensity scores. Before applying the matching
methods, we need to make sure that our treated and
control units share the same support so that they are
comparable. Treated cases off the common support,
that is, cases whose propensity score is higher than the
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score
of the controls need to be excluded. In our data set,
there is only one treated unit off the common support
and excluded. There are a wide variety of matching
methods available, such as nearest neighbor matching,
radius matching and kernel matching. The primary

advice to select between them is to select the method
that yields the best balance [27-29]. After trying all the
aforementioned methods, we find kernel matching is
the optimal matching method for our study. Table 4
shows the reduction in bias on observables achieved
through the kernel matching. From Table 4, it is
evident that the matching achieves an appreciable
reduction in bias on observables. Specifically, the
absolute bias of all the covariates is less than 5%, and
all the p-values are larger than 0.05.

Table 4. Summary statistics and covariate comparison before and after matching
Variable
Education
Marital status
Gender
Age
Image verified
Edu verified
Phone# verified
IDCer. verified

Sample
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched
Unmatched
Matched

Mean
Treated
Control
3.6288
3.6507
3.6289
3.6251
1.4614
1.5642
1.4613
1.4634
1.1262
1.1422
1.126
1.1279
29.362
30.993
29.358
29.531
.68253
.46551
.68266
.67981
.28742
.26295
.28747
.29716
.86058
.72898
.86074
.86102
.84845
.6535
.84861
.84812

Table 5 shows the results of ATTs obtained before
and after matching. The results support the Hypothesis
1. We find significant differences in default rate
between treated and control groups.

%bias
-1.9
0.3
-20.7
-0.4
-4.7
-0.6
-28.6
-3.0
45.0
0.6
5.5
-2.2
33.0
-0.1
46.3
0.1

%reduced
|bias|
82.5
97.9
88.2
89.4
98.7
60.4
99.8
99.7

t-test
t
p>|t|
-0.99
0.323
0.17
0.865
-10.86
0.000
-0.22
0.822
-2.47
0.014
-0.29
0.770
-15.01
0.000
-1.69
0.091
23.61
0.000
0.32
0.752
2.88
0.004
-1.10
0.270
17.29
0.000
-0.04
0.968
24.21
0.000
0.07
0.944

Although the t-statistics obtained after matching is
smaller than that obtained before matching, the
statistics is still significant even at p=0.01 level.

Table 5. Comparisons of ATTs
Variable
Default

Sample
Unmatched
Matched

Treated
0.131
0.131

Finally, we conduct sensitivity analysis to check
for hidden bias. Since matching is based on the
conditional independence or unconfoundedness
assumption, if there are unobserved variables that
simultaneously affect assignment into treatment
(microblog disclosure) and the outcome variable
(borrower’s default), a hidden bias might arise [30].
Since estimating the magnitude of selection bias with

Controls
0.235
0.237

ATT
-0.104
-0.106

S.E.
0.00731
0.00813

T-stat
-14.27
-13.04

non-experimental data is not possible, we address this
problem with the bounding approach proposed by [30].
Instead of testing the unconfoundedness assumption
itself, Rosenbaum bounds provide evidence on the
sensitivity degree to which any results hinge on the
untestable assumption. The results in Table 6 show
that our study is not sensitive to a hidden bias until the
bias doubles the odds of borrower’s default.
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Table 6. Sensitivity analysis: Rosenbaum critical p-values for treatment effect
Δ
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0

p-value
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.001
<0.01
<0.1
>0.1

who registered after the date. We tested this argument
and find that the relationship is strongly positive,
suggesting that registration after 2011 June has a
predictive power for microblog disclosure. Meanwhile,
the instrument also meets the exclusion restriction.
Registration after the June of 2011 could hardly affect
the likelihood of default through any direct channel
that is independent of microblog disclosure. The result
of the IV model is reported in Table 7, where we
instrument for microblog disclosure with the
instruments of registration after the June of 2011. The
result confirms the Hypothesis 1.

5.1.3 Identification through Instrumental Variable.
Besides the PSM technique, we also use an
instrumental variable for microblog disclosure to
identify causality of the model. A suitable instrument
for microblog disclosure should be exogenously
related to borrowers’ decision on disclosing microblog
but did not affect the likelihood of default. We notice
that ppdai.com did not provide a function on its
webpage to help borrowers disclose their microblog
till the June of 2011, therefore the borrowers who
registered in ppdai.com before the June of 2011 is less
likely to disclose their microblog than the borrowers

Table 7. Results of IV model
Variable
Microblog_disclosed
Controls
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01

Parameter
Std. error
-1.896***
0.122
(Included in estimation)

5.1.4 Difference-in-Difference Model Although the
result of the logistic model shows that disclosing
microblog account is a predictor of default probability,
it does not tell the underlying cause: is it because that
the borrowers being afraid of social stigma costs? We
use a DID model to identify the cause. In the April of
2013, the P2P company launched a marketing
campaign to encourage borrowers to disclose their
microblog accounts. We estimate the effect of the
campaign on the default probability of a loan whose
borrower disclosed his/her social media account. The
estimated model is as follows
(

borrower of a loan has disclosed his microblog,
otherwise it equals 0. The dummy variable Cmp is a
time variable, which takes the value 0 and 1 for
periods prior to and post the campaign. Controls
represent a vector of loan characteristics, such as loan
amount, interest rate, and lending period. The main
parameter of interest is
. The result of
is
negative and significant (see in Table 8), suggesting
that this campaign negatively influences the default
probability of the loans whose borrowers have
disclosed his/her social media account. One possible
reason for this to happen is that these borrowers care
about social stigma costs, because they may worry that
after this campaign, the P2P lending company could
use their microblog account as an outlet to spread the
word if a default occurs, which increases their social
stigma costs. With this worry in mind, they are less
likely to default after the campaign.

)

The dummy variable Mb_disclosed equals 1 if the

Table 8. Results of DID Model
Variables
Mb_disclosed

B

S.E.

Sig.

-.652

.051

.000
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Cmp
Mb_disclosed
Controls

Cmp

-.199

.052

.000

-.274

.087

.002

(Included in estimation)

5.2 The Effect of Microblog Metrics on Default
Probability
For this analysis, we create a combined dataset in
which data are obtained from ppdai.com and sina.com.
We select borrowers who disclose their microblog
accounts in ppdai.com, and collect the microblog
metrics (e.g. #Followers, #Friends, #Fans and
#Microblogs) from their profile pages in sina.com. This
combined data sample includes 5239 listings.
We use a logit model to estimate the default

probability of the effect of the microblog metrics on
default likelihood for borrowers who have disclosed
his microblog.

Because of the large variance and scale of the
microblog metric variables, we take the natural log of
them in the model. The results are presented in Table
9.

Table 9. Results of Logit Models
#Followers

M(1)
-0.153***
(0.022)

#Microblogs

M(2)

M(3)
-0.132***
(0.035)

M(4)

M(5)

-0.121***
(0.020)

-0.024
(0.032)

-0.043*
(0.026)

-0.047
(0.030)

#Friends

-0.174***
(0.039)

#Fans

M(6)

M(7)
-0.157***
(0.023)

-0.153***
(0.038)
-0.111***
(0.034)

Influential

-0.079***
(0.028)
0.062
(0.099)

Controls

(Included in estimation)

* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01

Model (1) and (2) analyze the effect of #Followers
and #Microblogs, respectively. The independent
variable in both models is negatively related to the
default probability at the 0.01 significance level. The
results demonstrate that the larger the scope of the
social network a borrower has in a social media site,
the less likely he defaults on a loan; the more
engagement a borrower has with his social media site,
the less likely he defaults. Both Hypothesis 2a and 2b
are supported.
However, the effect of #Microblogs is no longer
significant when both #Followers and #Microblogs are
included in Model (3), which indicates that
#Microblogs may be closely related to #Followers. As
mentioned before, followers can be categorized into
friends and fans in the microblog site. Since writing
microblogs are the major way for a borrower to attract
fans, #Fans probably has a strong relationship with
#Microblogs. While friends are usually acquaintances
in real life, #Friends is likely to have a weaker
relationship with #Microblogs. In other words, the
information that #Microblogs conveys is a supplement

to #Friends, but not to #Fans. It is confirmed by the
results of Model (4) and (5).
We next examine the effect of two different types
of social network, that is, friends and fans. For a
borrower, both friends and fans he has in the
microblog site are the sources of his social capital.
Either friends or fans knowing about a borrower’s
default can damage his social image and cause a social
stigma cost, therefore, both #Friends and #Fans should
have an effect on borrower’s default likelihood.
However, as previous studies have demonstrated, close
friends have a stronger behavioral effect on each other
than strangers do [31, 32]. We therefore expected that
the effect of #Friends on borrowers’ default likelihood
should be more intensive than that of #Fans. Model (6)
shows that #Friends and #Fans are both negatively
related to the default probability with p<0.01, but the
coefficient of #Friends almost doubles relative to that
of #Fans. The results indicate that although both
variables are predictors of default likelihood, #Friends
is a stronger signal than #Fans.
We also consider that a borrower having a large
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#Followers is more likely to have a healthy financial
situation as an influential person. Therefore, their low
default probability may be due to their financial
well-being instead of avoiding costs in social capital.
To examine this probability, we ran Model (7) with an
additional term for a borrower’s influence, which can
also be regarded as proxies for financial position. From
Sina microblog site, we get not only the data of how
many followers a borrower has (e.g. #Followers) but
also the data of how many people the borrower is
following (e.g. #Followings). It is reasonable to assume
that #Followers of influential borrowers is always
greater than #Following. Therefore, we created a
dummy variable ―Influential‖, whose value equals to 1
when #Followers is greater than #Following, otherwise,
equals to 0. The result of Model (7) shows that
#Followers remain significant while Influential is not
significant. The former conjecture is denied.

5.3 Prediction Performance of the Models
We have proposed several variables as predictors
of borrowers’ default likelihood. In order to
demonstrate their prediction power, we evaluate the
proposed models with AUC, which is the area under
the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve.
AUC is a standard metric for assessing models that
predict classification probabilities [33]. A model that
yields a higher AUC generally offers greater
predictive power than a model that produces a lower
AUC [34].
In Table 10, we show AUCs of the proposed
models and those of the benchmark models (the
models without the proposed variables). The
integrated model in the last column includes the
variables of both microblog_disclosed and microblog
metrics (#Fans and #Friends).

Table 10. AUCs of Models
Microblog_Disclosed

Microblog Metrics

Model

Benchmark

Proposed

Benchmark

M(1)

M(2)

M(4)

M(6)

Integrated
Model

AUC

0.6231

0.6573

0.6247

0.6522

0.6456

0.6534

0.6557

0.6636

First, all the AUCs in Table 10 are greater than 0.5,
which suggests that the predictive power of the models
is higher than that of random guess [34]. Second,
Table 10 shows that the AUCs of all the proposed
models are greater than the benchmark models, which
means the proposed models have more predictive
power than the benchmark models. Finally, the
integrated model, which includes all the proposed
variables, has the largest predictive power among all
the models. These results indicate that the models with
soft information on borrowers’ social media
outperform the models without such information.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the signaling effect of social
media information on borrowers’ credit worthiness in
P2P lending. The results suggest that social media
information can be the signal of creditworthiness on
two levels. On the first level, for all the borrowers in
the market, their decision on whether disclosing their
social media accounts or not is a predictor of their
default probability. On the second level, for the
borrowers who choose to disclose their social media
accounts, their social media metrics, such as their
social network scope and their inputs in the social
media site, are predictors of default probability.
Our study contributes to the literature across IS and
finance disciplines. Lenders on P2P lending

marketplaces use soft information to screen borrowers
[7], and our study adds to the literature on soft
information [8-12] by examining a new category of soft
information. Specifically, our results indicate that
social media information is useful for the prediction of
borrowers’ default probability. To our knowledge, it is
the first study that examines the usage of social media
in personal finance. While most of literature regards
social media as a marketing tool, we provides a new
point of view by regarding social media as an
information source for individual creditworthiness.
Moreover, our results provide a new insight to
improve risk control in P2P lending in China. On the
one hand, individuals in China do not have a
well-verified credit score, such as FICO score, which
enlarges the information asymmetry in Chinese P2P
lending markets. On the other hand, about 80% of
Internet users in China have a social media account
[35]. Their social media activity provides a rich set of
information that could be used by P2P lending markets
for credit assessment. Our study demonstrates the
validity of this approach and highlights the importance
of leveraging social media information in P2P lending
markets in China.
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